State of Utah v. George Pappas : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1978
State of Utah v. George Pappas : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Robert B. Hansen; Attorney for Respondent;
Dean R. Mitchell; Attorney for Appellant;
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, State v. Pappas, No. 15567 (Utah Supreme Court, 1978).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1017
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15567 
GEORGE PAPPAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE 
G. HAL TAYLOR, JUDGE, PRESIDING 
DEAN R. MITCHELL 
507 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Appellant 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Fl 
JUL111978 
1 
'• 
:_'f-
. .; 
'' 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE------------------- 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT---------------------------- 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL------------------------------- 1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS------------------------------------ 2 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: A. APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO 
RAISE ENTRAPMENT AS A DEFENSE 
AT TRIAL BY FAILING TO FILE 
TIMELY PRE-TRIAL NOTICE AS 
REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-2-303(4) (1953)----------------- 3 
B. APPELLANT DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN 
OF PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF AN 
AFFI~ffiTIVE DEFENSE---------------- 7 
C. IF THE APPELLANT DID NOT WAIVE 
HIS RIGHT TO RAISE ENTRAPMENT 
AS A DEFENSE AT TRIAL, THE TRIAL 
JUDGE PROPERLY RULED AS A MATTER 
OF LAW BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
NOT IN CONFLICT-------------------- 8 
POINT II: A. APPELLANT MAY NOT QUESTION THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF THE EVIDENCE ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE NO OBJECTION WAS 
MADE AT TRIAL---------------------- 11 
B. IF REVIEW OF THE ADMISSIBILITY OF 
THE EVIDENCE IS GRANTED, THE 
EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED----- 13 
POINT III: THE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING STATEMENT 
WAS PROPER AND NOT PREJUDICIAL----- 16 
POINT IV: THE TAPE RECORDING WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE------------- 19 
POINT V: A. APPELLANT HAIVED HIS RIGHT TO HAVE 
THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE INSTRUCTION 
CONSIDERED ON APPEAL--------------- 22 
B. IF NO WAIVER IS FOUND, THE 
INSTRUCTION WAS A PROPER STATEMENT 
OF THE CHARGE---------------------- 23 
POINT VI: UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL--------------------- 24 
CONCLUSION-------------------------------------------- 25 
-i-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
CASES CITED 
Page 
Darr v. People, 568 P.2d 32 (Colo. 1977)---------- 25 
Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976)----- 9 
Matthews v. State, 42 Ala.App. 406, 166 So.2d 
883 (1964)----------------------------------- 18 
Minton v. State, 468 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.Crim.App. 
1971)---------------------------------------- 18 
People v. Fishel, 270 Mich. 82, 258 N.W. 217 
(1935\--------------------------------------- 17 
People v. Hollm-1ay, 568 P.2d 29 (Colo. 1977)------ 25 
People v. Spencer, 31 Cal.Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d 
134 (1963)----------------------------------- 21 
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958)----- 10,11 
State v. Adams, 26 Utah 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191 
(1971)--------------------------------------- 12 
State v. Anderson, 25 Utah 2d 26, 474 P.2d 735 
(1970)--------------------------------------- 6 
State v. Bridwell, 566 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1977)------ 14 
State v. Cowan, 26 Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 
(1971)--------------------------------------- 6 
State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1977)--------- 9,14 
State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 
(1941)--------------------------------------- 16 
State v. Georgopoulos, 27 Utah 2d 53, 492 P.2d 
1353 (1972)---------------------------------- 15 
State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976)-------- 7,15 
State v. Keith, 26 Utah 2d 338, 489 P.2d 436 
(1971)--------------------------------------- 12 
State v. McMahon, 26 Utah 2d 316, 489 P.2d 112 
(1971)--------------------------------------- 12 
State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421, 432 P.2d 50 
(1967)--------------------------------------- 13,15 
State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968)- 12 
State v. Schultz, 27 Utah 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 
(1972)---------------------------------------
State v. Shupe, 554 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1976)---------
State v. Sommers, 569 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977)-------
State v. Soroushirn, 571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977)----
-ii-
10 
9 
24,25 
9,10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
(Continued) 
Page 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (1973)-- 18,19 
State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 (1937)------- 6 
State v. Weaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d 167 (1931)------ 22,23 
State v. Whitely, 100 Utah 14, 110 P.2d 337 (1941)--- 6 
State v. Zeman, 63 Utah 422, 226 Pac. 465 (1924)----- 15,22,23 
United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64 (5th Cir. 
1977)------------------------------------------- 21 
United States v. McKeever, 169 F.Supp. 426 
(5th Cir. 1977)--------------------------------- 19,22 
United States v. McMillan, 508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 
1974)------------------------------------------- 20 
Whetton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 47, 497 P.2d 856 
(1972)------------------------------------------ 21 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-504 (1953), as amended--------- 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(4) (1953)------------------ 3,4,14 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-303(6) (1953)' as amended------ 14 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-308 (1953), as amended--------- 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-4-101 (3) (b) (1953)--------------- 25 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953)--------------------- 1,23-25 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-22-17(1)-(4) (Supp. 19 77) -------- 4-6 
OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence----------------------- ll 
45 A.L.R.3d 958-------------------------------------- 6 
58 A.L.R.2d 1024------------------------------------- 21 
61 A.L.R.3d 293-------------------------------------- 14 
105 A.L.R. 1288-------------------------------------- 15 
-iii-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPHEME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
Case No. 
15567 
GEORGE PAPPAS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEl"IENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged with attempted theft by 
receiving, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury and found guilty 
of aLtempted theft by receiving on October 26 and 27, 1977, 
in the Third District Court, the Honorable G. Hal Taylor, 
presiding. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmation of the verdict and 
judgment of the lower court. 
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STATEilliNT OF FACTS 
In September, 1976, the Salt Lake City Police 
Department initiated an undercover operation targeted at 
traffic in stolen goods in the City; the operation was 
designed to utilize a police operative who would attempt 
to sell "stolen" goods while monitored by the police. 
On September 8, 1976, Rudy Dale Sandoval, a convicted 
burglar incarcerated in the county jail, was equipped 
with an eJcctronic monitoring device, given a new clock 
radio and sent to appellant's service station (T.l6-l7). 
Sandoval was instructed to represent the radio as stolen 
and to sell it to appellant. A sale was made to appellant 
at the service station. The electronic equipment was 
tested before the sale and was found to be working 
properly (T.l7); the entire transaction was carried out 
under police surveillance, both visual and electronic 
(T.l9). During this first transaction, Sandoval asked 
appellant if he would be interested in any other goods 
(T.34). Appellant indicated that certain other goods 
would be acceptable (T.34); a date for an exchange was 
arranged for the following day. 
The same procedure detailed above was repeated 
on September 9, 1976, with two changes: firearms replaced 
the clock radio (T.22), and Judge Maurice Jones accompanied 
-2-
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the police and witnessed the monitoring (T.25). Following 
the second sale, Judge Jones issued a search warrant; 
appellant was arrested and the clock radio and the 
firearms were seized (T.26). 
At trial officers Martinus Vuyk and John Stoner 
testified along with Sandoval as to the transaction and 
the accuracy and authenticity of the tape recording made 
during both sales (T.23,40,47). The tape itself was 
introduced over objection and played to the jury (T.5l). 
Defense counsel called no witnesses and intro-
duced no evidence; appellant did not testify. The defense 
of entrapment was introduced for the first time on a motion 
for directed verdict (T.52); the motion was denied, the judge 
ruling as a matter of law that entrapment had not occurred 
(T. 55). 
Appellant was found guilty by the jury and sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
A. APPELLANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO RAISE ENTRAPMENT 
AS A DEFENSE AT TRIAL BY FAILING TO FILE TH1ELY PRE-TRIAL 
NOTICE AS REQUIRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-303(4) (1953). 
-3-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Utah Code l\nn. § 76-2-303 (4) (1953), requires 
that written notice of intent to rely on the defense of 
entrapment be submitted at least ten days before trial: 
"(4) Upon written motion of the 
defendant, the court shall hear evidence 
on the issue and shall determine as a 
matter of fact and law whether the 
defendant was entrapped to commit the 
offense. Defendant's motion shall be 
made at least ten days before trial 
except the court for good cause shown 
may permit a later filing." 
Appellant failej tn submit any written notice and did not 
offer any reason for not doing so. Even though the trial 
judge did not specifically base his ruling on a waiver 
theory, respondent maintains that the reasoning underlying 
this statute dictates that appellant should not have been 
allowed to ignore the requirements of the statute. 
Requiring written pre-trial notice of a defendant 
relying on entrapment allows the prosecution to adequately 
prepare for the trial. This reasoning finds support in 
the Utah cases interpreting Utah Code l\nn. § 77-22-17(1)-
(4) (Supp. 1977), the notice of alibi statute, which is 
very similar to the notice of entrapment in Section 
76-2-303 (4): 
"(l) Upon the written demand 
of the defendant, the prosecuting 
attorney shall specify in writing 
as particularly as is known to him, 
the place, date, and time of the 
commission of the offense. A 
defendant in a crimin3l case, whether 
or not such written demand has lJcen 
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made, vrho intends to offer evidence 
of an alibi in his ~efense shall, not 
less than ten days before trial or 
such other time as the court may 
direct, file and serve upon the 
prosecuting attorney a notice in 
writing of his intention to claim 
an alibi; the notice shall contain 
specific information as to the place 
\vherc the defendant claims to have 
been at the time of the alleged 
offense and, the names and addresses 
of the witnesses by whom he proposes 
to establish the alibi. Not less 
than five days after receipt of 
defendant's witness list, or such 
other times as the court may direct, 
the prosecuting attorney shall file 
and serve upon the defnedant the names 
and addresses of the witnesses the state 
proposes to offer in rebuttal to 
discredit the defendant's alibi at the 
trial of the cause. 
(2) Both the defendant and the 
prosecuting attorney shall be under a 
continuing duty to promptly disclose 
the names and addresses of additional 
witnesses which come to the attention 
of either party subsequent to filing 
their respective witness lists as 
provided in this section. 
(3) If a defendant fails to file 
and serve a copy of the notice as 
required in subsection (1), the court 
may exclude evidence offered by the 
dc~endant for the purpose of proving 
an alibi, except the testimony of the 
defendant himself. If the prosecuting 
attorney fails to file and serve a copy 
on the defendant of a list of witnesses 
as provided in subsection (1), the court 
may exclude evidence offered by the 
state in rebuttal to the defendant's 
alibi evidence. 
-5-
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(4) For good c~use shown the 
court may waive the requirements of 
this section." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-22-17 (Supp. 1977). 
In State v. Waid, 92 Utah 297, 67 P.2d 647 
(1937), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the purpose 
of the notice of alibi statute was to prevent wrongful 
use of the defense and to allow adequate preparation time 
for the prosecution. This rationale was approved in State 
v. \vhit-?lv, 100 Utah 14, 110 P.2d 337 (1941), and most 
-------
recently Ln State v. Anderson, 25 Utah 2d 26, 474 P.2d 735 
(1970). See also 45 A.L.R.3d 958. The similarity of the 
entrapment and alibi defenses and statutes is such that 
the reasoning of the cases cited above should apply to 
entrapment and the instant case. In State v. Anderson, 
supra, failure to give proper notice of an alibi defense 
was held to bar defendant from raising it at trial. 
Failure to make a timely request for an entrapment 
instruction was fatal for a defendant in State v. Cowan, 
26 Utah 2d 410, 490 P.2d 890 (1971). If not made aware 
of the defense of entrapment, the prosecution may fail 
to present available evidence or be foreclosed from 
locating rebuttal witnesses. In the instant case, no 
formal mention of entrapment was made until well into 
the trial; defense counsel sought to argue the theory 
-6-
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in his closing argument. Respondent contends that 
appellant lost the right to raise the defense of entrap-
ment by failing to comply with the notice requirement of 
the entrapment defense statute. 
B. APPELLANT DID NOT MEET HIS BURDEN OF 
PRESENTING EVIDENCE OF AN AFF'Iffi1ATIVE DEFENSE. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-308 (1953), as amended, 
makes entrapment an affirmative defense. Both statute, 
Section 76-1-504 (1953), as amended, and case law, 
State v. Hoffman, 558 P.2d 602 (Utah 1976), require that 
evidence of an affirmative defense be presented at trial. 
In the instant case, appellant did not testify, introduced 
no witnesses or exhibits, made no opening statement, and 
cross-examined only one witness for the prosecution. 
Appellant argued that the tape recording introduced by 
the prosecution supported the theory of entrapment. 
Respondent contends that merely referring to a part of 
the prosecution's case does not constitute presenting 
evidence of entrapment. Appellant offered virtually no 
defense at trial; he should not be allowed to ignore 
statutory requirements for the defense of entrapment, put 
forth little or no case of his own, and interject an 
affirmative defense at so late a stage in the trial. Not 
-7-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only would the prosecution be prejudiced thereby, but the 
jury, were appellant given his way, would be forced to make 
a decision on a defense concerning which no evidence had 
been presented. In light of these factors, the trial 
judge properly denied appellant the defense of entrapment. 
C. IF THE APPELLANT DID NOT \'JAIVE HIS RIGHT TO 
RAISE ENTRAPMENT AS A DEFENSE AT TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE 
PROPERLY RULED AS A HATTER OF LAW BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS 
NOT IN CCl_'TLIC'l. 
While both the so-called "objective" and "sub-
jective" methods of analysis for entrapment cases historical~ 
have each been followed in Utah, appellant correctly states 
that the current trend is to follow the subjective approach. 
The subjective method focuses primarily on the predispositioo' 
I 
of the defendant to commit the crime and not the actions of 
the police officers involved, as with the objective method. 
Each method of analysis is designed to aid the trier of 
fact in determining guilt where the evidence is in conflict. 
If neither the predisposition of the defendant nor the 
methods used by the police is seriously disputed, none of 
the underlying social and judicial policy considerations 
behind the objective and subjective theories can be offended. 
Respondent submits that under the subjective method, if the 
-8-
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defendant's predisposition to commit the crime is never 
disputed, there is no reason to submit the theory of 
entrapment to the jury. 
Under the subjective theory, a judge may determine 
as a matter of law that entrapment has occurred. State v. 
Soroushirn, 571 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1977). In Soroushirn, this 
Court ruled that because there was no evidence to suggest 
that the defendant would have committed the crime without 
police induce~ent, entrapment had occurred as a matter of 
law. In State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744, 747 (Utah 1977), this 
Court approved of the notion that entrapment was a question of 
fact when there 1vas conflicting evidence. The Utah Supreme 
Court also stated that a question was properly for the jury 
when the evidence was in conflict in State v. Shupe, 554 P.2d 
1322 (Utah 1976). 
In Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976), 
the United States Supreme Court held that where a defendant 
conceded that he was predisposed to commit a crime, the 
defense of entrapment was unavailable to him. Respondent 
maintains that appellant in effect conceded his predisposi-
tion in the instant case by failing to put forth any evidence 
that he was not so predisposed. The use of the subjective 
analysis focuses on the defendant's predisposition; when the 
-9-
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defense fails to counter the prosecution's evidence, there 
is no conflicting evidence and it is unnecessary to submit 
the issue to the jury. To do otherwise would be to have 
the jury decide issues without the aid of having them fram~ 
and sharpened at trial. The result would be an exercise 
in pure speculation. 
If a trial judge can rule as a matter of law 
that entrapment has occurred as in Soroushirn, a similar 
absence o~ e~l:2nce should allow a judge to rule as a 
matter of !_a,_.; that entrapment has not occurred. In State v. 
Schultz, 27 Utah 2d 391, 496 P.2d 893 (1972), the defendant 
contended that he had acted as an agent of the police in 
procuring drugs and sought an instruction to that effect. 
In assessing the evidence supporting a defense of entrapment, 
this Court, citing Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 
(1958),. stated: 
"Whether there was such entrap-
ment depends upon what the evidence 
shows as to the facts; and it is to be 
determined as are other issues of fact. 
If it is so clear that all reasonable 
minds must find one way, then the trial 
court should rule as a matter of law and 
take the issue from the jurv. Conversely, 
if there is a basis in the evidence upon 
which reasonable minds could differ, then 
the determination should be made by the 
jury." 496 P.2d at 895. 
On rehearing, it was determined that there was sufficient 
-10-
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evidence of an ag8ncy relationship to submit the issue 
Lv ~he jury, ho•~vEr, the statement of the basic premise 
cited above and Sherman, supra, remain good law. 
The instant case is unlike virtually all other 
Utah entrapment cases; in most instances evidence of 
personal friendships, sexual favors, agency, inducement 
lasting months or some other evidence is sufficient to 
create a reasonable doubt concerning entrapment. No such 
evidence is present in the instant case. Respondent does 
not argue that the trial judge should usurp the role of 
the jury as fact finder; however, in the rare case such 
as this where no evidence of the defendant's predisposition 
or lack thereof is offered by the defense, a ruling by the 
judge as a matter of law should be allowed. 
POINT II 
A. APPELLANT MAY NOT QUESTION THE ADMISSIBILITY 
OF THE EVIDENCE ON APPEAL BECAUSE NO OBJECTION WAS !1ADE AT 
TRIAL. 
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence requires 
that any objection concerning the admissibility of evidence 
be made in a timely manner at trial. The contemporaneous 
objection rule allows the trial judge to conduct the trial 
without using what the defendant contends is tainted 
evidence. Appellant did not make any objection to the 
-11-
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issue on appeal. 
In Stnte v. ~dams, 26 Utah 2d 377, 489 P.2d 1191 
(1971), evidence of other misconduct of the defendant 1-ras 
introduced without objection. This Court held that the 
absence of any objection at trial precluded any review 
on appeal. See also State v. Keith, 26 Utah 2d 338, 489 
P.2d 436 (1971); State v. McMahon, 26 Utah 2d 316, 489 
P.2d 112 (1971). Respondent contends that appellant is 
barred from raising this issue on appeal because of the 
absence of objection at trial. 
The plain error doctrine should not be applied 
in the instant case because appellant did not suffer any 
injustice. In State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 
(1968), cited by appellant, the doctrine was invoked where 
highly prejudicial pictures of a bloody victim were given 
to the jury. The admission of other acts of the defendant 
did not evoke the emotional revulsion in the jury that Poe 
was concerned with. Because the admission of the evidence 
did not amount to obvious prejudice and injustice, plain 
error should not be invoked. 
-12-
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R. IF REVIEIJ OF THE 1\D!-HSSIBILITY OF THE EVIDEHCE 
IS GRANTED, THE EVIDENCE \~AS PROPEHLY ADMITTED. 
While appellant did not give written notice as 
required by statute of his intention to rely on entrapment, 
he did orally inform the prosecution of that plan at a 
pre-trial hearing (T.53-54). The prosecution, thus put on 
notice, introduced evidence in its case in chief of previous 
transactions between the police agent and defendant. This 
evidence was properly admitted as showing the absence 
of an innocent predisposition that is the basis of an 
entrapment defense. State v. Perkins, 19 Utah 2d 421, 432 
P.2d 50 (1967). In Perkins, this Court allowed in such 
evidence of other misconduct in the prosecution's case in 
chief, stating: 
"The evidence regarding prior 
contacts between the agent and the 
defendant was competent to rebut the 
claim of entrapment. It was offered 
to enable the jury to determine 
whether the defendant was an innocent 
person whose mind was being influenced 
by suggestions oE the agant or whether 
he had a disposition to deal in 
narcotics when the proper situation arose. 
lvhile it is true that evidence of 
prior similar crimes may not be offered 
until the defendant makes a showing of 
entrapment, nevertheless the defendant 
may make such a showing by his cross-
examination of the State's witnesses, and 
the defendant by remaining silent should 
not orevent the State from showing the 
true picture if the issue of entrap~ent 
is to go to the jury • 
.. ----------------------------~~3-
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The defendant in this case did 
not affirmatively offer evidence of 
entrapment and now wants us to 
announce the rule that until he 
does, no evidence of prior de~lings 
between the defendant and the agent 
can be received in evidence. 
This we refuse to do. We think 
and hold that in any case where the 
issue of entrapment is introduced 
by the defendant and the prior contacts 
betlveen the defendant and agent can 
properly be given in evidence to 
show the state of mind of the defendant 
even '"hen such contacts shmv unlawful 
acts, unless the defendant makes known 
to the court that he is not relying 
upon entrapment as a defense." Id. at 
52. (Emphasis added.) 
See also 61 A.L.R.3d 293. Contrary to appellant's 
assertion, Perkins has not been overruled by legislative 
action; it remains good law as evidenced by its citation 
in the majority opinion in State v. Curtis, supra, and 
the subsequent reliance on Curtis by the Court in State v. 
Bridwell, 566 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1977). 
Appellant seeks to rely on the objective approach 
of Perkins in Point I of his brief and then deny its 
precedential value in Point II. Another internal incon-
sistency in appellant's argument is his attempt to avoid 
the notice provisions of Section 76-2-303(4) and yet to 
rely on Section 76-2-303(6). Appellant should be required 
to be consistent in conforming to all statutes and case 
law, not merely selected favorable portions. 
-1/l_ 
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In receivins stolen property cases, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that evidence of other acts 
and possession of other "stolen" property is admissible 
to show the guilty knowledge of the individual. State v. 
~, 63 Utah 422, 226 Pac. 465 (1924); State v. 
Georgopoulos, 27 Utah 2d 53, 492 P.2d 1353 (1972). 
See also 105 A.L.R. 1288. Respondent asserts that 
the evidence in this case is admissible under this theory 
as well. 
The trial tactics of defense counsel in 
this case placed the prosecution in an almost impossible 
position. After introducing entrapment at the pre-trial 
hearing, no evidence supporting the defense was 
introduced at trial as required by State v. Hoffman, 
supra. The prosecution should not have evidence 
supporting its case in chief taken away by this type of 
maneuver. Defense counsel's failure to object to the 
evidence made the situation even more uncertain and 
should be held to preclude review. If review is 
permitted, the evidence was properly admitted under the 
rule of State v. Perkins, supra, and State v. Georgopoulos, 
supra. 
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POINT III 
TilE PROSECUTOR'S OPENING STl\TEflEWr W\S PROPE11. AllD 
NOT PREJUDICif'_L. 
In making his opening statement to the jury, the 
prosecutor attemp·teo to explain the nature of the crime chars,, 
In doing so he stated, 
"MR. NIELSON:. .Now, again, if 
the Court will indulge me, I think it's 
important that you understand the nature 
of the crime that has been charged here 
t, .: '~-. 
o:>Il • .. ho receives stolen or hot 
pro~:r~; is sometimes referred to as a 
rene~ or a criminal receiver. Those 
ter~s t ill be referred to probably with 
considerable frequency during the trial 
today. There is no question in law 
enforcement experience that the activities 
o£ thieves and burglars and so on are 
supported in large ~easure by the stable 
and continuing market for stolen property." 
(T. 6). 
This statement follm··ed his warning thilt the jury was not to 
consider anything in his statement as evidence: 
"MR. NIELSON:. .The Judge has 
instructed you previously that what we 
say as lawyers in the opening statement 
and the closing arguments are not 
cvi~ence 2~d should no~ h? c0nsi~~~ed 
by you as such." (T .I\) • 
As stated in State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.U 
285 (1941), the prosecutor has wide latitude in making his 
opening statement, and the 
the trial judge. In Erwin, 
matter is one of discretion for 
the prosecutor's opening staterne::[ 
I 
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was some seventy-three pages long and contained much 
in~dnissibl0 hearsay. The Utah Supreme Court found that 
ther~ was no predjudice to the defendant because of the 
limiting instructions issued to the jury. 
In the instant case, ~he prosecutor's use of the 
word "fence" was to explain the charge of attempted theft by 
receiving stolen property. He did not call appellant a 
fence, nor did he implicate him in other theft by receiving 
cases. 
In discussing the use of counsel in argument of 
the 'Jord "fence," the Supreme Court of Nichigan stated in 
People v. Fishel, 270 Mich. 82, 258 N.W. 217 (1935): 
"In his argument to the jury the 
prosecuting attorney, it is claimed, 
characterized defendant as a 'fence.' 
The appellation was not mere vitupera-
tion, but a colloquial characterization 
of a receiver of stolen property. 
As was said in People v. Boneau, 
327 Ill. 194, 158 N .E. 431, 436: 'In 
his closing argument to the jury the 
state's attorney referred to the 
defendant as a "fence for thieves," 
and told the jury that a "fence" was 
" oldce i·Ihere robbers and thieves 
di~posed of their loot. The word 
"fence" is a colloquial expression 
used to designate a person who re-
ceives stolen goods from the persons 
who steal them. It was a fair 
inference from the evidence that 
defendant was a "fence" or a receiver 
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of stolen property knowing the same 
to hove been stolen, and the state's 
attorney did not exceed the limits 
of prop ~r argu11~en t in so denot:nc ill<J 
the defendant, and the latter has 
no just complaint that he was prejudiced 
thereby.'" Id at 218. 
See also Matthews v. State, 42 Ala. App. 406, 166 So.2d 88J 
(1964); Hinton v. State, 468 S.H.2d 426 (Tex. Crim. App. 197!1 
In State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 
(1973), this court stated that counsel are to be afforded Hie' 
latit~;dc -'-'' t!L: c ayguments to the jury. The Valdez court 
also set for·~ the test to determine whether a given remark 
is prejudicial: 
"The test of whether the remarks 
made by counsel are so objectionable 
as to merit a reversal in a criminal 
case is, did the remarks call to the 
attention of the jurors matters which 
they would not be justified in con-
sidering in determining their verdict, 
and were they, under the circumstances 
of the particular case, probably 
influenced by those remarks. The 
determination of whether the improper 
remarks have influenced a verdict 
is within the sound discretion of 
the trial court on motion for a new 
trial. If there be no abuse of this 
di3cration and substantial justice 
appears to have been done, the 
appellate court will not reverse 
the judgment." Id. at 426. 
Respondent contends that the use of the word "fence" in the 
instant case did not rise to the level of prejudice required 
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by tho court in Valde7.. The jury could easily have drawn the 
inference from the prosecution's case in chief tha·t appellant 
11as a "fence." The opening explanution did not in·troduce so 
umrarranted a stateroent as to require reversal. 
POIIJT IV 
THE TAPE EECOPDil~G \1AS PROPERLY AD'!ITTED INTO 
EVIDENCE. 
The case of United States v. rlcKeever, 169 p. Supp. 
426 (SONY 1958), is often cited as setting out the requirements 
for the admissibility of a sound recording into evidence; the 
seven requirements for admissibility are: 
"(1) That the recording device was 
capable of taking the conversation now 
offered in evidence. 
(2) That the operator of the 
device was competent to operate the 
device. 
(3) That the recording is authentic 
and correct. 
(4) That changes, additions or 
deletions have not been made in the 
recording. 
(5) That the recording has been 
preserved in a manner that is shown 
to the court. 
(6) That the speakers are 
(7) That the conversation elicited 
was made voluntarily and in good faith, 
without any kind of inducement." Id. 
at 430. 
Respondent contends that the foundation laid in the instant 
case meets the requirements of McKeever: 
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(1) The tape recorder was shown to be capable of 
recording the conversation by the testimony of Officer Vuyk. 
Vuyk stated that the device was tested immediately prior to 
the transaction and was found to be working properly (T.l7). 
Officer Stoner also verified the capability of the machine 
(T.S0-51). 
(2) Officer Stoner was competent to operate the 
recorder; his specific role in the operation was to oparate ~ 
electronics equipment (T.46). His competency was also 
exhibited in court by his operation of the machine in front 
of the judge and jury. 
(3) The authenticity of the recording was confirm~ 
by the testimony of Officers Vuyk and Stoner and Rudy 
Sandoval, the informant. The Court in United States v. 
508 F.2d 101 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. den., 421 U.S. 916, found 
that the testimony of the informant and the operator of the 
machine was sufficient to establish authenticity. 
(4) and (5) Officer Stoner testified that no 
changes had been made in the tape and that he had personal~ 
preserved its original condition by retaining it in his 
custody (T.47). 
(6) The identity of the speakers, appellant Pappas 
and Rudy Sandoval, was established by the testimony of Officer 
Stoner (T.48) and Sandoval (T.40). 
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(7) Sandoval testified that his particip~tion was 
volunt.ary (T. 40). l\ppellant did not ti'lke the stand; therefore, 
his voluntariness must be presumed from an absence of a coer-
cive atmosphere and from the substance of the taped conversation 
itself. 
It is significant to note that Judge Maurice Jones 
was present during the taping of the conversation (T.25). Any 
possibility of impropriety was elimina~ed by his overseeing 
the operation. 
The appellant in United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 
64 (5th Cir. 1977), raised virtually the same objections as 
appellant in this case. The court approved of a foundation 
for a tape recording that was established in almost an 
identical fashion as the instant case. See also People v. 
Spencer, 31 Cal. Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d 134 (1963), cert. den. 
377 U.S. 1007; 58 A.L.R.2d 1024. 
In I'Thetton v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 47, 497 P.2d 856 
(1972), the Utah Supreme Court held that a transcript of the 
trial proceedings Wi3s not essential to the preservation of 
appellant's rights. In finding that due process was not 
offended, this Court stated: 
"For these reasons, and based upon 
our own knowledge and experience, we 
deem it safe and proper to assume that 
proceedings have been carried on in 
conformity with the law. Accordingly, 
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when there is no transcript as to 
what happen~d. we indulge that pre-
sur.1pLi.on; and in the absence of 
rc-.t.~:l.L:::tsj-v"2 G_;-cu,r::, t~:c LL·-i_,:l CU 1.!..Ct 
~s the find~r of the facts is not 
obliCjed to find to the contracy." 
Id. at 858. 
Respondent maintains that the tape recording was 
properly adl'\itted as an exercise of the trial judge's discreti 
'l'he prosecution establi::;hed a proper foundc_tion that comport 5 
with the requirements of t'1cKeever, supra. Additionally, appel-
lant has suf:'cr: "~ injustice by not having a transcript of 
the tape. No jnd_;ation is made by appellant as to how any 
predjudice could ha\'e occurred from the lack of a transcript. 
In the absence of predjudice, the verdict below should be 
allowed to stand. 
POINT V 
A. APPELLAtlT 1'/AIVED HIS EIGHT TO !lAVE THE SUFFICIE .. j 
OF THI: INSTRUCTIOlJ COliSIDERED ON APPEAL. I 
Appellant made no objection to the sufficiency o£ 
the theft by receiving instruction at trial; respondent aver~ I 
that a failure to object constitutes a waiver and precludes 
appellant from raising the issue on appeal. 
In State v. Zeman, 63 Utah 422, 226 P. 465 (1924), 
and State v. Heaver, 78 Utah 555, 6 P.2d 167 (1931), the uta11 
Supreme Court held that a failure to object to an instructi~' 
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barred raising the issue on appeal. Doth cases involved 
churgcs of reccivinq stolen property. Respondent urges this 
court to apply the rule of Zeman and Weaver to the instant 
case. 
B. IF NO l•:AIVER IS FOUND, THE INS'rRUCTION v7AS A 
PROPI:t~ STATEt·lENT OF THE CHARGE. 
Appellant 11as charged 1-1ith Attemp·ted Theft by 
Receiving (R.6); appellant seeks to raise a distinction without 
a difference between the "shorthand" charge used in the infor-
mation and the formal felony of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1953), 
R~ceiving Stolen Property--Duties of Pawnbrokers. 
The Information states that appellant was charged 
with a violation of§ 76-6-408(1) of which reads: 
"76-6-408. RECEIVING STOLEN PROPEPTY--
DUTTES OF PAvJNBROKERS. -- (1) A person com-
mits theft if he receives, retains, or 
disposes of the property of another knowing 
that it has been stolen, or believing that 
it probably has been stolen, or who conceals, 
sells, withholds, or aids in concealing, 
selling, or withholding any such property 
from the owner, knowing the property to be 
stolen, with a purpose to deprive the owner 
thereof." 
Under the statute, an individual is guilty if he receives, 
retains or disposes of property. 
Instructions Eleven and Twelve used the words 
"received or retained." By eliminating "disposes," the trial 
judge accurately shaped the instruction to conform to the 
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evidence presented. Under the facts, appellant could have 
been found to either have recieved or retained property 
supported a guilty verdict. 
The Information charged appellant with a violation 
of ~ 76-6-408; it was the full language of that section that 
\·las in issue and not the "shorthetnd" reference to the t:i tle o' I 
the section as appellant contends. The instruct ions Here pro; 1 
and the jury's finding of guilt should be upheld. 
POINT VI 
UTI.:: C~:.J':: c..r:n. § 76-6-~08 IS CONSTITUTIONAL. 
The recent case of State v. Sorrmers, 5119 P.2d 1110 
(Utah 1977), nnkes it clear that property nee:! not be in fac: 
stolen to support a conviction for rccei ving stolen rroperty. 
In finding no violation of the due process clause, this Court 
stated, 
"[2,3] Thus to exculpntG defendant 
solely on the ground the television set 
he purchased was not, in fact, stolen 
property would shock the common sense 
of justice. The defense of impossibility 
is not a fundamental right essential to 
an L-:u1g lo-1\.mer ican rc0 i:tn~ o ;:- orcl8red 
liberty. The express abolition of such 
a defense advances the fundamental 
principles of liberty and iustice which 
support all of our civil a~d political 
instructions." Id. at 1111. 
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Accord: Darr v. People, 568 P.2d 32 (Colo. 1977); People 
v. Holloway, 568 P.2d 29 (Colo. 1977). While Sonuners dealt 
sp2cifically with Uta.h Code Ann. S 76-<)-101 (3) (b) (1953), 
respondent contends that the same logic should apply to 
§ 76-6-408. All policy, legal and constitutional considera-
tions are identical. Appellant was not denied due process 
in the instant case. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing reasoning and authority, 
respondent urges that this court affirm the ruling of the lol>er 
court and find appellant guilty of ~ttempted theft by 
receiving. 
Respectfully sub~itted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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